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COMPULSORY LICENSING BY JUDICIAL ACTION:
A REMEDY FOR MISUSE OF PATENTS

Neal Seegert*

I
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED

The Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the power
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."1 Since 1790 Congress has, in
exercise of this power, enacted legislation securing those rights.2 The
basic present day statutes provide as follows:
"Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvements thereof, or who has invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variet:)7 of plant,
· other than a tuber-propagated plant, not known or used by others
in this country, before his invention or discovery thereof, and not
patented or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his invention or discovery thereof, or more
than one year prior to his application, and not in public use or on
sale in this country for more than one year prior to his application,
unless the same is proved to have been abandoned, may ... obtain
a patent therefor." 3
"Every patent shall contain a short title or description of the
invention or discovery, correctly indicating its nature and design,
and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of sev"" A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., University of Michigan Law School; member of
Wisconsin Bar-Ed.
1 Art. 1, §8, cl. 8. For the background of English origins, see WALKER, PATENTS, c. l
(1937); Outline of the History of the United States Patent Office, 18 J. PAT. 0EE. Soc. No.
7 (1936); WooD, PATENTS AND ANnTRusT LAw, c. l (1942).
.
2 For history and development of the patent law in the United States, see WooD, PATENTS AND ANnTRusT LAw, c. 3 (1942); Outline of the History of the United States Patent
Office, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. No. 7 (1936); DEPT. oE CoMMERcE, THE STORY oF THE
AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: 1790-1940 (1940).
a R.S. §4886; 29 Stat. L. 692 (1897); 46 Stat. L. 376 (1930); 53 Stat. L. 1212 (1939).
Design Patents-R.S. §§4929, 4933.
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enteen years, of the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention or discovery (including in the case of a plant patent the
exclusive right to asexually reproduce the plant) throughout the
United States and the Territories thereof, referring to the specifi-::ation for the particulars thereof."4
Thus an inventor if he meets the requirements of the statute and complies with its mandates secures the exclusive right to make, use, or sell
the patented invention for seventeen years. Whether this right is a
property right,5 a privilege "conditioned by a public purpose",0 a franchise,7 or a contract,8 has been the subject of much recent discussion.9
Similarly writers differ as to whether the right conferred is or is not a
"monopoly".10 At any rate, two major propositions are basic; first, that
the patent right is based on the premise that progress of science and the
arts is to be promoted, not merely that the inventor is to be rewarded;11
second, that a condition to the grant is complete disclosure of the invention so that on the expiration of the patent anyone skilled in the art
may be able to practice it.12
The policy behind the patent laws has at least three aspects: first,
to encourage invention; second, to provide incentive for investment of
speculative capital in new fields that progress in science and industry
may be aided and a higher standard of living achieved;13 third, to encourage disclosure, as mentioned above. Some critics have attacked the
present system on the ground that the assumptions on which the patent
laws are based no longer accord with present day methods of competitive
R.S. §4884; 46 Stat. L. 376 (1930).
5"That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both by individuals and
by government, has long been settled." Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386
at 415; 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945); 324 U.S. 570, 65 S.Ct. 815 (1945).
6 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 at 382, 65 S.Ct. 741 (1945)-dissenting
opinion.
7 Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," T.N.E.C. MONOGRAPH No. 31, p. 158
(194l);'Meyers and Lewis, "The Patent 'Franchise' and the Antitrust Laws," 30 GEo. L. J.
117, 260 (1941-42), pp. 121-125.
8 See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 at 255, 66 S.Ct. 101 (1945).
9 See generally OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, pp. 468 et seq.
(1948).
10 Ibid., p. 78 for a discussion of the term "monopoly." That a patent is not a monopoly,
see WALKER, PATENTS, p. 25 (1937). That the true distinction to be made is not whether or
not a patent is a monopoly, but whether it is good or bad, see Woon, PATENTS AND THB
ANTITRUST LAW, p. 15 (1942).
11 Spencer, "Scientific Property," 18 A.B.A.J. 79 (1932).
12 Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Peters 1 (1829).
13 See-BENNETT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, c. 8 (1943); FoLK, PATENTS AND
INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS, pp. 167-181 (1942).
4
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enterprise.14 On the other hand, the Federal Patent Planning Commission has reported:
"The American patent system established by the Constitution
giving Congress the 'power to promote the progress of science and
useful arts', is over 150 years old. The system has accomplished all
that the framer~ of the Constitution intended. It is the only provision of the Government for the promotion of invention and discovery and is the basis upon which our entire industrial civilization
rests.
"The American people and their Government should recognize
the fundamental rightness and fairness of protecting the creations
of its inventors by the patent grant. The basic principles of the
present system should be preserved. The system has contributed to
the growth and greatness of our Nation; it has(1) Encouraged and rewarded inventiveness and creativeness, producing new products and processes which have placed
the United States far ahead of other countries in the field of
scientific and technological endeavor;
(2) Stimulated American inventors to originate a major portion of the important industrial and basic inventions of the past
150 years;
(3) Facilitated the rapid development and general application of new discoveries in the United States to an extent exceeding that of any other country;
( 4) Contributed to the achievement of the highest standard
of living that any nation has ever enjoyed;
(5) Stimulated creation and development of products and
processes necessary to arm the Nation and to wage successful
war;
( 6) Contributed to the improvement of the public health
and the public safety; and
(7) Operated to protect the individual and small business
concerns during the formative period of a new enterprise.
"The strongest industrial nations have the most effective patent
systems and after a careful study, the Commission has reached the
conclusion that the American system is the best in the world ...."16
This is not, of course, to say that abuses have not crept into the system
14 See Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," T.N.E.C. MoNOGRAPH No. 31 (1941),
p. 158; Kahn, "Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law," 30 AM. EcoN. REv.
475 (1940), for discussion see OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, pp. 475·

481 (1948).
i;;

FmsT REPORT OF NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING CoMMISSION, H. Doc. 239, p. 1,

78th Cong., 1st sess. (1943).
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and some reforms are not needed, but rather that the underlying theories
of the patent law are still sound.16
In contrast to the exclusive right to make, use and sell granted by
the patent law, the underlying policy of the anti-trust laws is the maintenance of a competitive system.17 Section I of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal. ..."18
Section 2 continues: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. ..."19 Similarly the Clayton Act20 contains prohibitions against
price discrimination and resale price maintenance. Whether the policies of these two sets of laws are consistent or opposed is again a matter
of disagreement. Wood says: "Fundamentally, however, the two are
perfectly consistent-that is, the Sherman Act applying only to unreasonable restraints has no application to the monopoly secured by patent
right."21 Compare, however, the approach of Justice Rutledge in the
dissenting opinion in the Hartford Empire case: "Basically these are
opposed in policy, the one granting rights of monopoly, the other forbidding monopolistic activities."22 Speaking of the interaction of the
policies of these two sets of laws, Wood says, "This anomaly results in
what we have called the patent-anti-trust dilemma. For while the rights
of the patentee must yield in any case of conflict with the interests of
the public at large, it is imperative that the curtailment and abridgment
of his rights be no greater than is necessary. In the adjustment of the
delicate balance between the rights of the individual and the public
welfare it is vital that the task be undertaken with the idea of granting
the inventor the maximt1m reward consistent with sound policy."23
16 See WooD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW (1942); WooD, THE UNITED STATES
PATENT SYSTEM, A SunvEY, Am. Enterprise Ass'n., Nat'l. Economic Prob. 420 (1946).
17 For a discussion of the economic conceptions of competition and monopoly, see OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, PP· 70-81 (1948).
18 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890).
19 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890).
20 38 Stat. L. 730 (1914).
21 WooD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAw, p. 40 (1942).
22 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 452, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945).
23 WooD, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM, A SunvEY, Am. Enterprise Ass'n.,
Nat'l. Economic Prob. 420, p. 17 (1946).
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II
ABUSES OF PATENT SYSTEM

A. Attempts to Extend Duration
Having viewed the fundamental problems, it is pertinent to outline
some of the alleged abuses of the American patent system as it operates
in our modern business and industrial economy and to canvass some
of the proposed remedies. First are abuses that might be termed attempts
to extend the duration of the patent monopoly. These stem mainly
from the procedural aspects of the patent laws. Foremost among them
is the problem of long pendency of applications, particularly the dilatory tactics that are possible under the law, which postpone issuance of
the patent, thus extending the time duration of the patent protection. 24
Closely allied are problems of lack of sufficient facilities and personnel
in the Patent Office, the complicated internal procedures and practices,
the time-consuming interference procedures, and other similar sources
of abuse inherent in the patent la\\'S as they stand.
B.

Failure to Use

Second are the problems of non-use of patents, "suppression," and
"fencing in.":!;;
"It may be said that, properly considered, there is an important
distinction between suppression and non-use. The case of suppression is one where for the sake of greater profits, the patentee
himself shelves and refuses to license others to use a technologically
· meritorious invention capable of being worked on a commercially
practicable scale. . . . Whether there is a wilful suppression in the
sense defined above or non-use based upon valid economic reasons
is a subject on which controversy continues unabated. Most discussion is on the level of opinion evidence."20
The writer goes on to list as factors frequently mentioned as matters
of justification for non-use the following: lack of capital for development work and marketing; avoidance of drastic displacement of labor;
unavailability of complementary devices; prohibitive costs due to too
rapid scrapping of existing eA-pensive equipment; public not ready to
24 See generally "Government and Economic Life," BROOKINGS !NsnTunoN, pp. 132134 (1939).
2:; By "fencing" is meant the acquisition of many improvement patents so that the original patentee, usually a competitor, cannot improve his invention. "Blocking" is the acquisi•
tion of many improvement patents by the patentee walling in the basic patent so that others
cannot enter the field.
20 OPPENHEIM; CASES oN FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, pp. 693-94 (1948).
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accept new ideas; lack of value and merit of invention; existence of
superior competitive products. Many leading scientists and industrialists have testified that suppression of patents is virtually non-existent.27
The attitude of the courts toward non-use of patents has long been
settled in the doctrine of the Paper Bag case28 to the effect that to preserve his exclusive right to make, use, or sell, an inventor need not work
his invention. Nor have the courts been prone to entertain bills to
compel patentees to license others.29 Recent developments, however,
may forecast overruling of the Paper Bag case. The dissenting Justices
in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe,30 referring to the Paper Bag case
thought that it was time to dispose of that rule.31
Whatever may be the future course of the law, most will agree that
the deliberate keeping of patents out of use to create monopolistic conditions in the art or to retard technological advancement is economically
indefensible.
"The Paper Bag and Special Equipment cases reserve for future
determination the question whether, upon an explicit showing in
the record of a particular case of prospective or actu~l non-use of the
patent, a court of equity will refuse to compel the issuance of the
patent or refuse to enjoin patent infringement if the non-use is contrary to public policy. When such clear proof is adduced, it is
probable that a doctrine of unreasonable non-use of patents may
emerge as a basis for denial of equitable relief. Simple non-use,
however, is not a violation of either common law or the public policy
of the patent and anti-trust laws."32

C. Extension of Patent Scope
Finally, there are abuses that might be categorized as unwarranted,
extensions of the scope of the patent monopoly. Since these are the
abuses that have generally been considered by the courts as misuses of
the patent and to which the courts have, in some instances, applied the
27 See Jewett, "Are Patents Suppressed? Record Fails to Support Charges," JL. OF CoM•
MERCE, 31 (March 11, 1943). Compare T.N.E.C. HEARINGS, Part 3, pp. 885, 908, 1000,
1003; Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise,'' T.N.E.C. MoNOGRAPH No. 31 (1941);
VAUGHAN, EcoNoMics OF Oun PATENT SYSTEM, c. 6 (1925).
28 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 28 S.Ct. 748
(1908).
2 9 F.A.D. Andrea, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of America (D.C. Del. 1936), 14 F. Supp. 226.
See also Radio Corp. of America v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp. (D.C. N.J. 1934), 10 F. Supp.
879,883.
30 324 U.S. 370, 65 S.Ct. 741 (1945).
31 For a general survey and excellent analysis of the legal situation, see Frost, "Legal
Incidents of Non-Use of Patented Inventions Reconsidered,'' 14 GEo. WASH, L. REv. 273,
435 (1946).
32 OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, p. 702 (1948).
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remedy of compulsory licensing, they will be more fully treated in part
III of this paper. For the present purpose, however, of drawing a general
background for the later analysis the general nature of these abuses will
be outlined.
First, there is the problem of consolidation or concentration of patents
in few hands,3 3 the corollary situations of patent pools,34 cross-licensing,35
and international cartels based on patent control.36 Second, there is the
problem of restrictions on use of patented inventions: (l) restrictions
placed upon a purchaser or sub-purchaser,37 (2) restrictions placed upon
a lessee of patented machinery, and (3) restrictions in licensing of
patented inventions.38 Third, there may be abuses in licensing by virtue
of restrictions on quantity of production and territory for selling. Fourth,
there is the problem of unwarranted extension of the patent monopoly
through the device of tying restrictions.3° Finally, there is the problem of
price fixing, both horizontal and vertical, and resale price maintenance.40
That many or all of these problems may involve both extension of
the patent monopoly and violation of the anti-trust laws is apparent from
the mere listing. At the very least it provides a setting for a consideration
of the various reforms that have been suggested from time to time.

D.

Suggested Remedies

Aside from those who would abolish the patent system altogether,4 1
the critics of our patent system fall more or less into two groups; first,
those who believe a thorough rewriting of the patent laws, with a view
33 For a brief but concise survey of this situation, see BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, GovERN·
MENT AND EcoNoMic LIFE, pp. 142-145 (1939).
34 Strictly speaking, a patent pool exists only where title to the patent is transferred.
See Workman, "Patent Pools in Relation to Patent Law," 13 A.B.A.J. 585 (1927); "Patent
Pools and the Sherman Act," 40 YALE L.J. 1297 (1931).
35 Licensing occurs where the patentee gives up a part of his exclusive right to make,
use, or sell to one or more other persons. See Beach, "Patent Cross-Licensing Agreements and
Methods of Their Administration," 19 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. pp. 578, 646 (1937).
36 For general discussion of the varied meanings of the word "cartel", see OPPENHEIM,
CASES ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, pp. 780-782 (1948). See also Toulmin, "The Law
of International Private Agreements," 32 VA. L. REv. 335 (1946).
3 7 See Chafee, "Equitable Servitudes on Chattels," 41 HARV. L. REv. 945 (1928).
38 See WooD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAw, pp. 53-63 (1942); Waite, "Validity of
Conditions in Patent Licenses,'' 41 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1942); Folk, "Patent License Conditions," 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 184 (1940).
39 See Handler, "Tying Restrictions in Patent Licenses," Trade Regulation Comments
No. 4, C.C.H. TRADE REGULATION SERVICE (1938); McCormick, "Restrictive Patent Licenses and Restraint of Trade," 31 CoL. L. REv. 743 (1931).
40 See WooD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAw, pp. 41-53 (1942); Callmann, "Patent
License Agreements Between Competitors and the Monopoly Issue," 28 GEo. L.J. 871 (1940);
Wood, "Agreements Concerning Patent License Restrictions," 37 ILL. L. REV. 350 (1943).
41 See Petro, "Patents: Judicial Developments and Legislative Proposals," 12 U. OF Cm.
L. REV. 80, 352 (1944-45).
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toward restricting the scope of the patent, is necessary to stamp out the
abuses, and second, those who maintain that the anti-trust laws if properly
enforced would remedy the situation. Legislative proposals have advocated changes both in the procedural aspects as well as the substantive
aspects of the patent law. On the procedural side, some of the more important.suggestions have been to date the period of patent protection
from the filing of the application, with a twenty year expiration period,42
eliminating the problem of long pendency; to simplify time consuming
interference procedure,43 and to cut down the cost of litigation by establishing a single court of patent appeals44 or a patent commission.45 Many
other miscellaneous proposals have been made.46 Proposed changes in
the substantive law have included: changes in the standard of invention
·with a view toward cutting down the number of patents issued and protecting only the more desirable inventions;47 limitations on the privilege
of assignment; 48 requirements of recording of patent transfers and agreements;49 and finally, proposals for compulsory licensing of patents.50
Some of these proposal_s would compel licensing of all patents, others
would restrict the operation to unused or suppressed patents, patents on
inventions related to public health, safety, or national defense, or merely
as a remedy for misused patents. One other type of suggested change
should be noted; namely, the proposals to abolish patent license restrictions.51
42 See FrnsT REPORT oI' NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION, pp. 18-19 (1943);
T.N.E.C. HEARINGS, pt. 3, p. 860.
43 See SECOND REPORT op THE SCIENCE ADVISORY BoARD, p. 336 (1935); T.N.E.C.
HEARINGS, pt. 3, p. 862.
44 See T.N.'E.C. FINAL REPORT, p. 37 (1941); FrnsT REPORT OI' NATIONAL PATENT
PLANNING CoMMISSION, p. 16 (1943); Rice, "A Court of Patent Appeals," 17 J. PAT. OPP.
Soc. 18 (1935); T.N.E.C. HEARINGS, pt. 31, p. 18046.
45 See Rice, "A Constructive Patent Law," N.Y.U. SCHOOL OI' LAW, CONTEMPORARY
LAw PAMPHLETS, series I, no. 12 (1939).
46 See OPPENHEIM, CAsEs ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, p. 496 (1948).
47 See T.N.E.C. HEARING, pt. 3, pp. 894, 1019; FrnsT REPORT OI' NATIONAL PATENT
PLANNING"COMMISSION, pp. 14-15 (1943).
48 See T.N.E.C. HEARING, pt. 2, pp. 557-558, pt. 3, pp. 845-848.
49 See T.N.E.C. FINAL REPORT, p. 37; FoLK, PATENTS AND INnusTRIAL PROGRESS, pp.
336-337 (1942); FrnsT REPORT oP NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION, p. IO (1943).
50 See Wyss and Brainard, "Compulsory Licensing of Patents," 6 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
499 (1938); Borkin, "Patent Abuses, Compulsion to License and Recent Decisions," 43 CoL.
L. REV. 720 (1943); BARNETT, PATENT PROPERTY AND THE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAWS, pp.
549-551 (1943); Reik, "Compulsory Licensing of Patents," 36 AM. EcoN. REv. 813 (1946);
Schechter, 'Would Compulsory Licensing of Patents be Unconstitutional?", 22 VA. L. REv.
287 (1936); T.N.E.C. FINAL REPORT, p. 36 (1941); see also_discussion in Woon, PATENTS
AND ANTITRUST LAw, pp. 194-199 (1942), and BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, GOVERNMENT AND
EcoNoMic LIPE, pp. 150-151 (1939).
·
51 See discussion in Woon, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAw, pp. 200-211 (1942);
T.N.E.C. FINAL REPORT, p. 36 (1941).
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Meanwhile the courts have developed some remedies for abuses of
the patent monopoly. Mention should be made of Judge Arnold's attempts to raise the standard of invention and refusal to issue patents where
it appears that the invention is not to be used: the decisions in Potts v.
Coe,52 Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Coe,5 3 and Special Equipment Co. v.
Coe. 64 By far, however, the most important developments have come in
the use of the device of compulsory licensing of patents for misuse as
initiated by the Hartford-Empire decision/;; and allowance of the defense
of patentee's violation of the anti-trust laws in actions involving patents.56
It is the latter two developments that v,1il1 be the subject of analysis and
discussion in part IV of this paper.

III
WHAT Is "M1susE"?

To analyze and evaluate properly the development of compulsory
licensing through judicial action as a remedy for misuse of patents, it is
first necessary to determine what the courts have considered such misuse. At the outset one problem common to all of the varieties of misuse
must be considered: namely, whether when a patentee exceeds the proper
scope of the patent protection the violation is to be judged by the doctrines of the anti-trust laws including application of the "rule of reason,";;7 or whether the violation is to be considered a per se violation of
the anti-trust laws. The conventional doctrine has been that,
" ... the anti-trust laws are deemed to be violated only when, in
the specific situation of extra-patent control, there is a definite
factual showing of illegality as measured by the standards of the
anti-trust laws. This may mean that either there is a per se violation
of the anti-trust laws or there is a violation of the anti-trust law based
upon an application of the 'rule of reason'.... When it is found,
therefore, that the patentee has stepped outside the bounds of his
patent grant, determination of whether his conduct also violates
52 App. D.C. (1944) 145 F. (2d) 27. See "Recent Developments in the Law of Patents
Under Thurman Arnold,'' 45 CoL. L. REv. 422 (1945); Gottschalk, "Further Comments on
Recent Patent Decisions and Current Trends,'' 26 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 151, 184, 186 (1944).
53 145 F. (2d) 18 (App. D.C. 1944).
54 324 U.S. 370, 65 S.Ct. 741 (1945); 58 HARV. L. REv. 726 (1945); 93 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 456 (1945); 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 770, 774 (1945).
55 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945); 324 U.S.
570, 65 S.Ct. 815 (1945).
56 See generally, Lockhart, "Violation of Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions,"
31 MINN. L. REV. 507 (1947).
57The rule has its origins in the famous Standard Oil Case of 19ll, 221 U.S. 1, 31
S.Ct. 502.
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the anti-trust laws may involve consideration of any one or more of
the following diverse situations:
(1) Restraint of trade by contract, combination or conspiracy
under Sections I and 3 of the Sherman Act.
(2) Monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, or combining or
conspiring to monopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
(3) Substantial lessening of competition or tendency to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce under Section 3 of the Clayton
Act.
( 4) Violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
in combination, conspiracy and monopoly cases where the Commission has concurrent jurisdiction for violations of the Sherman Act.
(5) In foreign trade cases, application of the standards of the
Webb-Export Trade Act, the Wilson Tariff Act anti-trust provision
and other provisions relevant to restraints on imports or exports.
( 6) Possible applications of standards of special anti-trust acts
applicable to agriculture, shipping, fisheries, wire and radio, transportation and power."58
The newer theory developing is that any unwarranted extension of
the patent grant is per se a violation of the public policy of the anti-trust
laws. This theory was given impetus in the opinion of Justice Douglas
in the second Mercoid case,59 and followed up with the decision in
United States v. International Salt Co.,00 where the court held that tying
clauses are per sea violation of section I of the Sherman Act. Carried to
its logical extremes this doctrine would make all extensions beyond the
scope of the patent grant violations of the anti-trust laws on the basis of
violating the policy of the laws. Whether the violation arises under any
specific provision of the legislation would become immaterial. It would
no longer be necessary to determine the extent of the control or to apply
the "rule of reason." With this general doctrinal background in mind
attention may now be turned to the specific practices which the courts
have deemed to be misuse of patent rights. ·

A. Concentration of Patents
The 6.rst category of misuses to be considered will be that relating to
patent concentration, patent pools, cross licensing, and international
58 OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, p. 486 (1948).
59 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268 (1944).
See also Wood, "The Tangle of Mexcoid Case Implications," 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 61 at

79-81 (1944).
oo 6 F.R.D. 302 (D.C. N.Y. 1946); International Salt Co. Inc. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947). See generally OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS, pp. 482-491, 677-683 (1948).
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cartels based on patent control. One characteristic of the patent laws
must be kept in mind at this point: namely, that the patentee's right to
exclude others from making, selling, or using his invention may be
waived wholly or in part by assignment or license to others.61 Without
this provision patent concentration could occur only to the extent of one
man's inventiveness. The law being as it is, however, patent control may
be achieved through the acquisition of patents by assignment or exclusive
license from the inventor, by pooling, or by cross licensing. Viewing
these arrangements in and of themselves, the law, in general, has found
very little violation of the anti-trust laws.
To be sure, "the extent to which a single individual or concern may
acquire patent rights in the absence of agreements with others so to concentrate patents is still unsettled".62 However, where pools and cross
licensing are concerned, the legality of the arrangement has generally
been determined by the application of the general principles of the antitrust law.63 Thus the courts have declared illegal pools which resulted
in agreements, conspiracies, or monopolies which were found unreasonably to restrain trade and commerce.64 Again in the famous Bath Tub
case65 it was found that the cross licensing arrangement was merely a
camouflage for practices forbidden by the anti-trust laws. On the other
hand, in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) et al. v. United States66 a cross
licensing arrangement was found valid where there was no unreasonable
restraint.
It should be noted that many cases involving patent pools and cross
licensing agreements have contained other features which have been
deemed misuses of patents, and that the arrangement has been stricken
down because of those elements rather than the mere fact of the pool. 67
One of the most recent cases exemplifying this is the Hartford-Empire
61 Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 22 S.Ct. 747 (1902); U.S. Rev. Stat.
tit. 60 §4898 (1898).
62 OPPENHEIM, CAsEs ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, p. 553 (1948).
63 See Wooo, PATENTS AND ANnTRusT LAw, c. 4 (1942); "Patent Pools and The
Sherman Act," 40 YALE L.J. 1297 (1931); Callmann, "Patent License Agreements Between
Competitors and The Monopoly Issue," 28 GEo. L. J. 871 (1940); Workman, "Patent Pools
in Relation to Patent Law,'' 13 A.B.A.J. 585 (1927); Podell and Kirsch, "Patent Pools and
the Antitrust Laws,'' 13 A.B.A.J. 430 (1927); Toulmin, "Patent Pools and Cross Licenses,''
22 VA. L. REv. 119 (1935).
64 National Harrow Co. v. Hench et al. (C.C.A. 3d, 1897), 83 F. 36; Blount Mfg. Co. v.
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. (C.C. Mass. 1909), 166 F. 555; United States v. New Departure
Mfg. Co. (D.C. N.Y. 1913), 204 F. 107.
65 Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 33 S.Ct. 9
(1912).
66 283 U.S. 163, 51 S. Ct. 421 (1931).
67 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32, 38 S.Ct. 473 (1918);
United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd. (D.C. Del. 1944), 54 F. Supp. 828.
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case. Indeed, most of the evils commonly attributed to patent pools stem
rather from other conditions of the agreement than from the pool itself.
This, of course, points up one of the dangers of patent pools, which when
coupled with the difficult problem of determining the reasonability of
the arrangement, brings this area of the law into a prominent position
with the critics.
On the other hand, others stress the necessity and benefits of patent
pooling, pointing out that especially in the case of ''blocked" patents, cross
licensing is indispensible and in fact increases competition and furthers
industrial and technological progress. 68 The general consensus seems
to be that patent pooling or cross licensing is both necessary and desirable. A word should be said about international cartels based on patent control. 69 In the leading recent decision, United States 11. National
Lead Co. et al., 10 the Supreme Court held illegal an international cross
licensing arrangement which constituted a monopoly in restraint of trade.

B. Restrictions on Use
1. Of patented article. The second category of practices in which
the courts have found misuse of patents relates to those having to do with
restrictions on use71 of either the patented article or the patented invention.72 Looking first at the situation involving the patented article, one
must distinguish two situations; first, sale of the article, and second, lease
of the article, usually a device or machine.
Insofar as the purchaser is concerned, the courts have developed the
doctrine that sale of the patented article removes it completely from the
patent monopoly; 73 with the sale goes an unrestricted license to use. The
problem has usually been how far the patentee may impose restrictions
by contractual agreement. In general this is a question of general law and
will be determined on the basis of its unreasonableness as a restraint of
68 See WooD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW, pp. 99-117 (1942); "Patent Pools and the
Sherman Act," 40 YALE L.J. 1297 (1931).
69 See Toulmin, "The Law of International Private Agreements,'' 32 VA. L. Rllv. 335
(1946); OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, c. 14 (1948).
10 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (1945); aff'd 332 U.S. 319, 67
S.Ct. 1634 (1947). See Zlinkoff & Barnard, "The Supreme Court and a Competitive Econ•
omy: 1946 Term," 47 CoL. L. REv. 914 at pp. 933-948 (1947).
71 See generally, Chafee, "Equitable Servitudes on Chattels," 41 HARV. L. REv. 945
(1928).
72 The problems of tying clauses and price fixing will be treated separately infra.
73 Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall. 453 (1873); Boston Store v. American Giaphophone Co.,
246 U.S. 8, 38 S.Ct. 257, (1918); Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, (C.C.A. 3d,
1921) 271 F. 810.
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trade.;-1 Such restrictions may be imposed either by express contractual
provision or may be in the form of a notice attached to the article. Few
cases aside from those involving tying clauses or price restrictions have
arisen in this field,rn but the legality of certain restrictions on the use of
unpatented articles where the restriction is reasonable provides an apt
analogy/ 0 The courts have not, however, been prone to uphold restrictions on the place of use.ii
On the other hand, where a lease of the patented article is involved,
the courts have upheld restrictions which were reasonable/ 8 Thus it may
be possible for the patentee who leases patented machinery to restrict the
uses to which the machine may be put, the quantity that may be produced, or the place in which it may be;! used/ 0
2. Of patented invention. The courts have been much more ·willing
to uphold reasonable restrictions in licenses to make or sell under the
patented invention. Thus the licensor may restrict the place of manufacture,80 limit the type of product to be made,81 designate the classes of
persons to whom the licensee may sell,82 restrict the conditions under
which sales may be made and the purposes for which the article may be
sold,83 and restrict the quantity of output. 84 Similarly the right of the
74 See Havighurst, "Legal Status of Industrial Control by Patent," 35 ILL. L. R:Ev. 495,
(1941); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film, 243 U.S. 502 at 509, 37 S.Ct. 416
(1917).
75 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. Inc., 305 U.S. 124, 59 S.Ct.
116 (1938) involves the problem, but the case was decided on other grounds.
70 See Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937);
Waring v. Dunlea, (D.C. N.C. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 338.
77 Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355, 13 S.Ct. 1047 (1893); Edison Electric Light Co.
v. Goelet, 65 F. 613 (C.C. N.Y. 1894); see generally Keasbey, "Restrictive Covenants as
Applied to Territorial Rights in Patented Articles,'' 10 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1896); compare
Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 10 S.Ct. 378 (1890).
78 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32, 38 S.Ct. 473 (1918); see
Folk, "Scope of the Patent Monopoly and the Relation of the Anti-trust Laws to the Patentee's
Individual Exercise of his Patent Rights," 2 N.A.M. LAw DIGEST, 149, 154 (1939).

70Jbid.
80 Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788 (1869); Dorsey Revolving Harvester
Rake Co. v. Bradley Mfg. Co., (C.C., N.Y. 1874) 7 Fed. Cas. n. 4015.
81 Good Humor Corp. v. Popsicle Corp., (D.C. Del. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 344, aff'd (C.C.A.
3d, 1939) 66 F. (2d) 659.
82 Radio-Craft Co. v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. (C.C.A. 3d, 1925) 7 F. (2d)
432; Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Tri-City Radio Electric Supply Co., (C.C.A. 8th,
1927) 23 F. (2d) 628.
83 Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket Co., 4 F. Supp. 644 (1933), 10 F. Supp.
171 (1935), (C.C.A. 2d, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 245; Vulcan Mfg. Co. v. Maytag Co., (C.C.A.
8th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 136; General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304
U.S. 175, 58 S.Ct. 849 (1938); 305 U.S. 124, 59 S.Ct. 116 (1938).
84 Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1907) 154
F. 358, app. dismissed, 210 U.S. 439, 28 S.Ct. 764 (1908); Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill (C.C.,
N.J. 1887) 32 F. 697; cf. American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill (C.C.A. 7th, 1934) 69 F. (2d)
406.
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licensor to require the licensee to purchase patented improvements from
a particular manufacturing source has been upheld.8 ;; The legality of this
type of restriction has been criticized, though attempts to change the law
by legislation have not met with success.80
3. Of nonpatented material-tying clauses. Where the licensor has
attempted to impose conditions concerning the use of nonpatented material by means of a tying clause, the courts have found a much more fertile
field for declaring the practice a misuse of the patent. A correlative situaation is one in which the patentee holds a combination patent or a
patented process or method and in licensing or selling one part of the
combination or the use of the process, method, or combination, attempts
to require the licensee to buy an unpatented element or material from
himself or a designated person. The trend has been to declare more and
more of these attempts illegal. At this point one should keep in mind the
discussion above concerning the two possible theories on which courts
have declared the practices now under consideration illegal, and hence a
misuse of the patent monopoly. The earlier cases considered the conditions purely under the anti-trust laws and tested the restrictions in the
light of the rule of reason except where the anti-trust laws themselves
declared the practices a per se violation. Thus in the second United Shoe
Machinery case8 ; the tying clauses were held invalid under section 3 of
the Clayton act. 88 Similarly a requirement in a lease of machines that
the lessee should use only tabulating cards manufactured by the lessor
was held invalid.89
However, a requirement that dealers should not sell or use in the
repair of Chevrolet motor vehicles any part not manufactured or authorized by the Chevrolet Motor Company was upheld because there was
no showing that the restriction in any way substantially lessened competition or tended to create a monopoly.90 In contrast, the later cases involving patent licenses find the restriction invalid on a finding that the patent
sr. Steiner Sales Co. v. Schwartz Sales Co., (C.C.A. 10th~ 1938) 98 F. (2d) 999, cert.
denied, 305 U.S. 662, 59 S.Ct. 364 (1939).
so See Justice Dept. Amicus Curiae Brief in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 58 S.Ct. 849 (1938); 305 U.S. 124, 59 S.Ct. 116 (1938). For
proposal to outlaw all restrictions in licenses as to price, amount, purpose, or manner of use or
area, see T.N.E.C. Report, S.Doc. 35, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941).
s1 United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 42 S.Ct. 363, (1922).
88 Section three of the Clayton Act prohibits tying clauses, requiring that a competitor's
goods shall not be used, in contracts of lease or sale where the effect is substantially to lessen
competition. The section is expressly applicable to all goods, patented or unpatented. 38 Stat.
L. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. §14 (1934).
89 Intemat'l Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 56 S.Ct. 701
(1936).
oo Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., (C.C.A. 7th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 641 aff'd.,
299 U.S. 3, 57 S.Ct. I (1936).
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monopoly has been overstepped and the condition a violation of the
public policy of the anti-trust laws. Thus in the Motion Picture Patents
case91 an attempt to restrict the use of the licensor's device to use with
the licensor's film was held invalid. In the Carbice case92 a requirement
that the licensee buy an unpatented element of a combination from the
licensor was held invalid. The doctrine was extended in the Leitch case98
to invalidate a condition that the user of a patented process buy unpatented materials used in the process from the licensee. Finally in the
Mercoid case94 the Supreme Court held that the patentee of a -combination, a heating system, whose only source of revenue was the supplying
of the unpatented elements of the combination, could not enjoin as a
contributory infringer one who supplied those elements. The International Salt case95 gave definite shape to the doctrine of per se violation
of the anti-trust laws where the patent right is overstepped. Thus the
doctrine of the Supreme Court to outlaw "every use of a patent as a means
of obtaining a limited monopoly of unpatented material"06 leaves little
doubt as to the invalidity of the type of restriction under consideration,
whatever may be the rationale of the cases in the future.

C. Price--fixing Agreements
I. Horizontal price--fixing. The final category in which the courts
have found unwarranted extensions of the patent monopoly lies in the
field of price-fixing and resale price maintenance agreements. In the
field of price-fixing or horizontal price control (that is, pricing agreements between competitors on the same level of the distributiop. process),
the Supreme Court has consistently found price-fixing agreements per se
an unreasonable restraint of trade regardless of the fairness of the price.97
This rule has been applied to agreements involving patents, with
91 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37
S.Ct. 416 (1917); Overrules, Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 364 (1912).
92 Carbice Corporation of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S.
27, 51 S.Ct. 334 (1931). See McCormack, "Restrictive Patent Licenses and Restraint of
. Trade,'' 31 CoL. L. REv. 743, 747, 761 (1931).
93 Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 288 (1938). See also Barber
Asphalt Co. v. La Fera Grecco Contracting Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 211; American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield, (D.C., ill. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 270.
94 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268 (1944).
See Wood, "The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications," 13 GEo. WASH, L. REv. 61 (1944);
Frost, "Patent Infringement and The Public Interest-The Mercoid Case," 12 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 345 (1944).
95 lntcrnational Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947).
96 Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 at 463, 58 S.C. 288 (1938).
97 United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377 (1927).
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one exception, if indeed, this exception any longer exists. The doctrine
was announced in the early case of Bement v. National Harrow Co.98
that a patentee might, in a license agreement, fix the price at which the
licensee could sell the patented article v.rithout violating the anti-trust
laws. Speaking of this doctrine the Supreme Court in the General Electric case!) 9 said: "If the patentee goes further and licenses the selling
of the articles, may he limit the selling by limiting the method of sale and
the price? We think he may do so provided the conditions of sale are
normally and reasonably adopted to secure pecuniary reward for the
patentee's monopoly." 100 This exception to the general rules has, however, been very narrowly restricted as will be seen from a discussion of
some of the following cases.
It is proper at this juncture to point out two settings in which the
question may arise; first, where there is a license in which the patentee
imposes price restrictions on competing licensees; second, where there
are agreements among licensees and with the patentee as to price restrictions.101
As to the first, the Wayne Pu-mp Co.102 case would seem to indicate
that a licensee and a patentee may agree that. the same restrictions shall
be imposed on all licensees. The case is, however, not authority on this
point since the court expressly disposed of the case on other grounds. A
more likely indication of the court's attitude is found in the analogous
field of copyrights where the court held such arrangements to be invalid.103
As to the second situation, agreements fixing the price are more
clearly invalid if the attitude· of the court in other recent cases is indicative.10:,i Note should also be made of the case where the patentee of a
machine tries indirectly to control the price of the unpatented product of
the machine by restricting the amount of allowable production. This
restriction in a license was held invalid.105
186 U.S. 70, 22 S.Ct. 747 (1902).
United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926).
1uu !bid. 490. Accord, Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket Co., (C.C.A. 2d,
1936) 82 F. (2d) 245; American Lead Pencil Co. v. Musgrave Pencil Co., 170 Tenn. 60, 91
S.W. (2d) 573 (1936).
101 See Wood, "Agreements Concerning Patent License Restrictions," 37 ILL. L. REV.
350 (1943).
102 United States v. Wayne Pump Co., (D.C. Ill. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 949, aff'd. 317
U.S. 200, 63 S.Ct. 191 (1942).
103 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 59 S.Ct. 467 (1939).
1 0 4 See United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265. 62 S.Ct. 1070 (1942).
10~ American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Building Material Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1934) 69
F. (2d) 406.
98
99
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Finally, in its t"vo most recent decisions in this field, the Supreme
Court has further narrowed the doctrine of the General Electric case. In
United States v. United Gypsum Co.106 the Court refused to allow the
rule of the General Electric case to cloak a conspiracy to fix the price of a
patented product in violation of the Sherman Act. In the companion
case, United States v. Line Material Co. et al.,1° 7 the Court speaking
through Justice Reed, held that the rule of the General Electric case
would not extend beyond the pure patentee-licensee situation to include
this case in which there had been a cross licensing between the holder
of the basic patent and the holder of an improvement patent in which the
latter was by the agreement to fix the price of the patented article for all
licensees. Indeed, four Justices108 concurring in the result would have
overruled the General Electric case thus doing away with the last vestige
of the exception. Three Justices dissented,1° 0 and one took no part in the
case.110 Thus the validity of price-fixing in patent licenses has been
restricted to a very narrow compass if it can be said to have survived at all.
2. Vertical price--fixing. In the field of resale price maintenance or
vertical price-fixing, leaving aside for the moment the Miller-Tydings
amendment111 to the Sherman Act, the development has been much the
same. In the Dr. Miles case,112 a contract not to sell below a stated price
was held invalid as a violation of the Sherman Act. The doctrine was
soon applied to the sale of patented articles in Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell113 where the Court held that price control could not be imposed by
notice on either patented or unpatented articles. Similarly in Boston
Store v. American Grap hop hone Co. 114 it was held that resale price maintenance could not be effected by an express contract. These cases are
based on the general proposition that a sale of the article removes it from
the scope of the patent monopoly.11 5
On the other hand, where the patentee licenses a bona fide agent to
U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948).
U.S. 282, 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948). For further developments along this line see
United States v. General Electric Co., 79 U.S. PAT. Q. 124 (D.C. N.Y. 1948) Cf. Transparent
Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 67 S.Ct. 610 (1947).
108 JJ. Douglas, Black, Murphy and Rutledge.
100 JJ. Burton, Frankfurter, and Chief Justice Vinson.
110 J. Jackson.
m 50 Stat. L 693 (1937).
112 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376
(1911).
113 229 U.S. 1, 33 S.Ct. 616 (1913).
114 246 U.S. 8, 38 S.Ct. 257 (1918). For annotation on resale price maintenance of
patented articles, see 7 A.LR. 477, 19 A.LR. 928, 103 A.LR. 1336.
11 :; Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 453 (1873); Boston Store v. American GraphophoneCo., 246 U.S. 8, 38 S.Ct. 257 (1918); Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, (C.C.A.
3d, 1921) 271 F. 810.
100 333
107 333
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sell the article he may fix the price at which the agent will sell the article.116 But where a purported agency arrangement is used to cover up a
concerted effort to fix resale prices, the conspirators have been enjoined
under the Sherman Act.117 Similarly, the Court held invalid an arrangement whereby a patentee licensed gasoline refiners on condition that
they sell only to jobbers licensed by the patentee, with whom the patentee
had made price-fixing agreements.118 Finally, the Court held invalid
price-fixing agreements where the licensee merely sold the article in incomplete form, the final embodiment of the patented article to be completed by the sub-purchaser.119
3. Effect of valid patent. One more group of cases must be considered before the picture is complete. This is the situation which occurs
where price-fixing might be valid under the rule of the General Electric
case if the patent involved is a valid patent. Of course, if the patent is
invalid, the agreement is a simple price-fixing or resale price maintaining
arrangement invalid under the Sherman Act. The law prior to the group
of cases under consideration, however, estopped the licensee from questioning the validity of the patent.120 In Sola Electric Co. 11. Jefferson
Electric Co.121 a licensee being sued for royalties and injunction against
violation of a price-fixing provision was for the first time allowed to raise
the question of the invalidity of the patent to show violation of the
Sherman Act in the agreement. This doctrine was extended to actions
at law, as distinguished from the denial of equitable relief in the Sola
case, in the Katzinger1 22 and MacGregor cases.123 Finally, in the U.S.
Gypsum case124 the Supreme Court held that the government in an anti116 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926).
117 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 62 S.Ct. 1070 (1942). See Mulholland, "Agency as a Concept and Marketing Device Under the Anti-Trust Laws," 13 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 93 (1944).
·
,
11s Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 60 S.Ct. 618 (1940). See
''Effect of Sherman Act on Fixing Prices of Patented Goods by Agency Licensing Agreements,"
51 YALE L.J 299 (1941).
110 United States v."Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 62 S.Ct. 1088 (1942).
120 In a long line of decisions the court had assumed that a licensee could not question
the validity of the patent. See Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 289 (1856); United
States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310, 25 S.Ct. 240 (1905); see also dissent in MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 67 S.Ct. 421 (1947) where the
authorities are summarized.
121317 U.S. 173, 63 S.Ct. 172 (1942). See also 47 CoL. L. REv. 477 (1947), 41 Mi:cH.
L. REv. 984 (1943).
122 Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 67 S.Ct. 416
(1947). See 15 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 236 (1947), and Zlinkoff and Barnard, "The Supreme
Court and a Competitive Economy: 1946 Term," 47 CoL. L. REv. 914 (1947).
123 MacGregorv. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 67 S.Ct. 421 (1947).
See also related cases of Nachman Spring Filled Corp. v. Kay Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1943)
139 F. (2d) 781; Scott Paper Co. v. Marcahis Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 66 S.Ct. IOI (1945).
12-1 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948).
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trust action might attack the validity of a patent in order to show the
violation of the anti-trust laws which would result if the patent were
invalid. Thus the Court has further widened the area in which misuses
, of patents may be found.
4. Effect of lvfiller-Tydings amendment. There remains only to
consider what effect the Miller-Tydings amendment:1 25 to the Sherman
Act has had on the resale price maintenance of patented articles. It reads
in part as follows:
" ... Provided that nothing contained herein shall render illegal,
contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale
of a commodity which bears •.. the trade mark, brand, or name of
the producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free
.and open competition with commodities of the same general class
produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of
that description are lawful as applied to intra-state transactions,
under any statute, law or public policy now or hereafter in effect
in any State.... "120
The cases involving patented articles which have arisen since the passage of this amendment have been very few, partly because a patented
article seldom can come within the requirements of the statute. The
attitude of the courts, however, appears to be one of strictly construing
the statute as evidenced by the holding in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission127 where it was held that, in determining whether or
not the petitioner's magazine film was in free and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others,
reference must be had to other magazine type film, not to movie film in
general. Similarly in the Univis case128 the Miller-Tydings amendment
was deemed inapplicable since the defendant was not a manufacturer of
the "commodity" which the licensees sold, and the licensees were not
engaged in the "resale" of the same commodity they bought. Thus the
Miller-Tydings amendment appears to do very little in the direction of
widening the field of permissible resale price maintenance where patented articles are concerned. Indeed, the more original the invention,
the less likelihood there is of the article's coming within the requirements
of the statute.
L. 693 (1937).
four of the states have passed such legislation. See comment, 28 CAL. L.
REv. 477, 479 (1940).
121 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 158 F. (2d) 592; 15 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 5ll (1947).
12s United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 62 S.Ct. 1088 (1942); 37 ILL. L.
REv. 181 (1942); 29 VA. L. REv. ll2 (1942).
125 50 Stat.
120 All but
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IV
COMPULSORY LICENSING AS A SOLUTION

A. How Remedy May Be Applied
Having thus surveyed the practices which are deemed within the
permissible scope of the patent monopoly and conversely those practices
which are considered misuse of the patent, attention may now be turned
to a consideration of the cases in which the courts have employed the
remedy of compulsory licensing. At the outset it must be understood
that the remedy may be applied in two different ways. First, in an action
brough~ by the United States or an individual under the anti-trust laws,
the court may decree compulsory licensing. Second, the same net result
may be reached in an action brought by the patentee by denying him
relief either in equity or at law, as has been noted earlier, by virtue of
which he is unable to enforce his patent or a license agreement. In other
words, by allowing as a defense violation of the anti-trust laws or misuse
of the patent on the part of the patentee a net result of compulsory licensing is obtained.129 The latter development is first in point of time, dating
back to the Motion Picture Patents case.130 There the patentee of a
motion picture projector was denied injunctive relief against a user of
the projector who bought films produced by other companies contrary to
the license tying provision. Because the patentee was misusing his patent
he was denied equitable relief.
From that beginning the doctrine has been applied both in infringement actions and in actions to enforce license provisions or collect royalties, the type of misuse barring relief running practically the entire gamut
of misuses previously discussed. The great expansion of the doctrine
came with the Carbice case131 and the line of cases following it,132 culminating in the Mercoid cases.133 These cases were actions against
alleged contributory infringers. 134 Finally in Morton Salt Co. v. Sup120 See generally Lockhart, "Violation of the Antitrust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions," 31 M1NN. L. REv. 507 at 552 (1947); James, "Use of Patents to Control Unpatented
Materials," 28 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 427 (1946); Borkin, "Patent Abuses, Compulsion to License and Recent Decisions," 43 CoL. L. REv. 720 (1943).
130 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 S.Ct. 416
(1917).
131 Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 51 S.Ct. 334 (1931).
132 Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Co., 302 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 288 (1938); Barber
Asphalt Corp. v. La Fera Grecco Contracting Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 211.
133 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268
(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 64 S.Ct.
278 (1944).
134 It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the doctrine of contributory infringement. For a discussion of the impact of the Mercoid cases on the doctrine, see Wood, "The
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piger Co. 1 =rn an injunction was denied a patentee in an action against a
direct infringer because of the patentee's misuse of the patent. A similar
result was reached in the Chemical Co.136 case decided the same day.
Thus it is clearly established that misuse of a patent may result in denial
of relief to the patentee whether he proceeds against a direct or a contributory infringer. Subsequent decisions137 bear out this doctrine with
one possible exception, the case of Metallizing Engineering Co., Inc. v.
Metallizing Co. of America,1 :i 8 ,vhich seems to raise a dissenting voice. 139
Similar results have been obtained where a patentee who has misused
his patent attempts to enforce the provisions of a license agreement or
collect royalties. In the Sola case14 " the patentee sued to collect royalties
and to enjoin violation of a provision of the license and was denied relief
because he ha~ been using the patent in an attempt to maintain resale
prices. Likewise in the Katzinger141 and MacGregor142 cases where
patentees merely sought to collect royalties they were denied relief because of their misuse of the patent monopoly. \i\lhile not involving a
patent, the latest words of the Supreme Court on the matter of the availability of the defense of violation of the anti-trust laws in actions on a
contract143 would seem to inject some confusion into the picture. However, the majority opinion in that case certainly cannot be cited as authority for the proposition that the statutory remedies given by the anti-trust
Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications," 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 61 (I 944); Bateman, "Should
Anti-Trust Law Penalties or Unenforceability of the Patent Monopoly be Invoked for Misuse
of the Patent Grant?", 29 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 16 at 48 (1947); Frost, "Patent Infringement
and the Public Interest-The Mercoid Cases," 12 GEO, WASH. L. REv. 345 (1944); 42 MICH.
L. REV. 915 (1944); 42 lLL. L. REV. 377 (1947).
1ar. 314 U.S. 448, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942).
13G B. B. Chemical Co. v. EIiis, 314 U.S. 495, 62 S.Ct. 406 (1942).
137 Standard Register Co. v. American Sales Book Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F.
(2d) 612; Landis Machinery Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 141 F. (2d)
800; Frank Adam Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 146
F. (2d) 165; National Lockwasher v. Garrett, (C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 255; Strocco
Products Inc. v. Mullenbach et al., 67 U.S. PAT. Q. 168 (D.C., Cal. 1944); Miller v. Zaharias,
72 F. Supp. 29 (D.C. Wis. 1947); Barber-Coleman Co. v. National Tool Co. (C.C.A. 6th,
1943) 136 F. (2d) 339.
138 (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 62 F. Supp. 274. Cf. National Aluminate Corp. v. Permutit Co.,
(C.C.A. 8th, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 175; International Carbonic Engineering Co. v. Natural
Carbonic Products, Inc., (D.C. Cal. 1944) 57 F. Supp. 284; Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.
v. Sylvania Industrial Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 64 F. Supp. 516; Container Patents Corp. v.
Stant et al., (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) 143 F (2d) 170.
130 For a discussion of recent cases, see Bateman, "Should Anti-Trust Law Penalties or
Unenforceability of the Patent Monopoly be Invoked for Misuse of the Patent Grant?" 29
J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 16 (1947).
140 Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 63 S.Ct. l 72 (1942). See
also Nachman Spring-Filled Corp. v. Kay Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 139 F. (2d) 781.
141 Edward Kat-zinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 67 S.Ct. 416
(1947).
14 2 MacGregorv. 'Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 67 S.Ct. 421 (1947).
143 Bruce's Juices,•. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 67 S.Ct. 1015 (1947).
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laws are to be considered exclusive as to all violations of those laws. Thus
the availability of the defense of misuse of a patent or violation of the
anti-trust laws as applied in the patent cases previously discussed cannot
be said to be impaired.

B. Effect of Purge of the Misuse
There remains to be considered the effect of a patentee's purging
himself of the misuse on his ability to enforc~ the patent. Both the
Morton Salt and the Chemical Co. opinions iI?-dicate that when the misuse has been abandoned and its evil effects dissipated the patentee might
then be entitled to relief.144 In Novadell-Agene Corp. v. Penn et al. 145
the court did not specify what acts would constitute a purging, but did
indicate that the impairment of the patent monopoly would continue
only so long as the misuse persisted. One court issued an injunction
against future infringement on a showing during trial that the patentee
had changed his method of doing business.146 Another held that the
patentee's purge was complete five weeks after original denial of relief
and was allowed an accounting for infringement occurring after the
purge.147 On the other hand, the Supreme Court in the Chemical Co.
case148 indicated that mere willingness to abandon the illegal practice
expressed during litigation would not be enough to justify granting of
relief. While the cases are few and the picture not very complete, it
appears that until Congress declares that misuse of a patent works its
forfeiture, a patentee should be deprived of the aid of the courts only so
long as he continues the misuse and its effects persist.

C. Effect of Denial of Relief to Patentee
One more problem involved in this aspect of compulsory licensing
by judicial action must be considered; namely, the fact that denial of
judicial relief to a patentee who has misused his patent results in compulsory licensing royalty free, or in other words, a forfeiture of the patent
at least for a limited time. In contrast where the court has compelled
licensing in an anti-trust decree, it has insisted on licensing at a reason144 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 at 493, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942);
B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S 495 at 498; 62 S.Ct. 406 (1942).
145 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 764.
146 Universal Sewer Pipe Corp. v. General Const. Co., (D.C. Ohio 1941) 42 F. Supp.
132. See also Campbell v. Mueller (C.C.A. 6th, 1947) 159 F. (2d) 803.
147 Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Visking Corp., (C.C.A. 4th, 1943) 132 F. (2d) 947.
See also Slaytor & Co. v. Stebbins Anderson Co. (D.C. Md. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 96. Cf. A. L.
Smith Iron Co. v. Dickson, (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 3.
148 B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 62 S.Ct. 406 (1942).
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able royalty .149 It has been suggested by some writers1110 that the denial of
equitable relief does not necessarily preclude a damage action at law for
past infringement, thus in effect allowing the patentee compensation
for the use of the patent during the period of his misuse.151 Another
writer maintains, "Despite these indications to the contrary, there are
good reasons to anticipate the defeat of a plaintiff seeking only damages
for past infringement during a period while he was using the patent to
violate anti-trust policy."152 No cases to date have raised this issue and
it is difficult to predict the result in the present state of the law.

D. Anti-trust Decree Provisions
The second aspect of compulsory licensing of misused patents involves compulsory licensing provisions of anti-trust decrees. This device
appeared earlier in a number of consent decrees in anti-trust actions,1 113
but received its first approval by the Supreme Court, where the provision was not consented to, in the Hartford-Empire case.154 There the
defendants were guilty of a variety of violations of the anti-trust laws11111
and licensing of the patents involved was truly compelled as an element
of the relief afforded the government in breaking up the monopoly in
the glass industry. An important feature of the decision, however, was
the refusal of the Court to compel the licensing of patents royalty free.
Rather, provision was made for the licensing of patents at a reasonable
royalty to all who might thereafter apply for a license. If a reasonable
royalty could not be agreed upon, the applicant could apply either to the
149 See provisions of decrees in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,
65 S.Ct. 373 (1945), 324 U.S. 570, 65 S.Ct. 815 (1945); United States v. National Lead Co.,
332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947).
150 56 YALE L.J. 77 at 112-116 (1945); 45 CoL. L. REv. 601 at 618 (1945).
151 Since August, 1946, the statute relating to damages for infringement has provided
compensation shall be not less than a reasonable royalty for use of the patent, U.S. Rev. Stat.
tit. 60 §4921 (1898); 60 Stat. L. 778 (1946). See Wolff, "The Measure of Damages in Patentlnfringement Actions,'' 28 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 877 (1946).
152 Lockhart, ''Violation of the Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions," 31 MINN.
L. REv. 507 at 561 (1947).
153 United States v. Kearney & Trecker Corp. (D.C. Ill. 1941), United States v. Standard
Oil (D.C. N.J. 1942), United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (D.C. N.Y. 1942),
United States v. General Electric Co. (D.C. N.J. 1942), United States v. Aqua Systems, Inc.
(D.C. N.Y. 1942)-royalty free; United States v. American Bosch Corp. (D.C. N.Y. 1942)royalty free until termination of war. In United States v. General Electric Co., C.C.H. Trade
Reg. Serv. ,i 52,777 (D.C. N.J. 1942) and United States v. American Bosch Corp., C.C.H.
Trade Reg. Serv. ,i 52,888 (D.C. N.Y. 1942) there were provisions for reciprocal licensing.
154 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945). Second
opinion, 324 U.S. 570, 65 $.Ct. 815 (1945); 56 YALE L.J. 77 (1946); Marcus, "Patents,
Antitrust Law and Antitrust Judgments Through Hartford-Empire," 34 GEo. L.J. 1 (1945);
45 CoL. L. REv. 601 (1945); Coburn, "Compulsory Licensing by the Courts," 28 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc. 180 (1946); "Patents and the Anti-trust Laws: The Glass Container Industry,"
53 HARV. L. REv. 1°173 (1940).
155 See 34 GEo. L.J. 1 at 32 (1946).
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court or to the attorney general for appropriate action. In the second
compulsory licensing case to reach the Supreme Court, the National
Lead case,156 the government, along with one of the co-defendants, strenuously urged that the Court compel licensing of certain patents royalty
free. With very little reconsideration of the Hartford-Empire decision,
the Court refused this suggestion.157 A lower federal court followed the
lead of the Hartford-Empire case in United States v. Vehicular Parking
Ltd. et al.158 compelling licensing only at a reasonable royalty. Meanwhile, in a number of consent decrees compulsory licensing has been
provided for, usually at a reasonable royalty.159 Thus the doctrine of
compulsory licensing by anti-trust decree appears to be firmly established.

E. Enforcing the Decrees
There remain for consideration some of the problems raised by compulsory licensing provisions of anti-trust decrees if their administration
is to be effective. The first relates to general administration of the decree.
To date this matter has devolved upon the anti-trust division of the Justice Department. One writer points out the difficulties of this solution
and suggests other possible alternative agencies for such administration;160 namely, a master of the court; the Federal Trade Commission,
an arbitration board, or a newly created patent commission. Considering the possible alternatives, it appears that the Justice Department is
156 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947).
157 See discussion in Zlinkoff & Barnard, "The Supreme Court and a Competitive Economy: 1946 Term," 47 CoL. L. REv. 914 at 933 (1947).
1 58 (D.C. Del. 1944), 54 F.Supp. 828, decree modified (D.C. Del. 1945), 61 F. Supp.
656. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947).
um United States v. Bendix Aviation Corp., C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. 'if 57,444 (D.C.
N.J. 1946); United States v. General Electric Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. 'il 57,448 (D.C.
N.J. 1946); United States v. Diamond Match Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. 'if 57,456 (D.C.
N.Y. 1946); United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. 'il 57,489
(D.C. Ohio 1946); United States v. American Air Filter Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv.
'if 57,492 (D.C. Ky. 1946); United States v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv.
'il 57,498 (D.C. Cal. 1946); United States v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg.
Serv. 'if 57,603 (D.C. Mich. 1947); United States v. American Locomotive Co., C.C.H.
Trade Reg.Serv. 'if 57,621 (D.C. Ind. 1947); United States v. Rail Joint Co., C.C.H. Trade
Reg.Serv. 'if 57,287 (D.C. Ill. 1944), royalty free; Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. 'if 57,336 (D.C. Mass. 1945), royalty free;
United States v. American Lecithin Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. 'if 57,542 (D.C. Ohio.
1947), part royalty free, part reasonable royalty; United States v. Patent Button Co., C.C.H.
Trade Reg.Serv. 'if 57,579 (D.C. Conn. 1947); United States v. Auditorium Conditioning
Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. 'if 57,428 (D.C. N.Y. 1945), royalty free; United States v.
Electric Storage Battery Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. ,r 57,645 (D.C. N.Y. 1947); United
States v. Scovill Mfg. Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. 'if 62,223 (D.C. Conn. 1948); United
States v. Automatic Sprinkler Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. 'if 62,230 (D.C. Ill. 1948); United
States v. Dick & Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. 'if 62,233 (D.C. Ohio 1948), royalty free;
United States v. Gamewell Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg.Serv. 'if 62,236 (D.C. Mass. 1948).
100 See 56 YALE L.J. 77 at 104 (1945).
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probably the best administrative agency for this purpose provided it has
sufficient facilities for the job.
Another problem that is raised by those decrees that require a
reasonable royalty be paid for the use of the patent is the problem of
determining the royalty. Admittedly the solution is difficult, but no
more so than many other problems for judicial determination. Congressional recognition of this term161 in the determination of damages for
patent infringement would seem to bear this out. Furthermore, there is
some case law already in existence involving the problem.162 Thus the
determination of a reasonable royalty is not an unsurmountable barrier,
especially since in the majority of cases it will be settled by negotiation
in any event. One step toward simplification of this problem was taken
in the Vehicular Parking case1113 when an applicant was allowed to
intervene in the anti-trust proceeding for a determination of the terms
and conditions upon vvhich he might be granted a license under the
patents.
To be really effective the remedy of compulsory licensing for misuse
of patents perhaps should be made a matter for declaratory relief so that
in the absence of government action a petitioner might bring the patentee
into court to adjudicate his alleged misuse of the patent and appropriate
relief given. The only other alternatives for such a petitioner are to
infringe the patent hoping that his defense of violation of the anti-trust
laws will be upheld, or to wait until the government acts, if at all.
Neither are very conducive or safe courses for such petitioner. On the
other hand, a patentee ought not be subject to harassment at the suit of
everyone who thinks the patentee is misusing the patent. These and
other problems raised by compulsory licensing of patents by judicial
action are by and large unsolved, but it should be remembered that the
device is comparatively new and that judicial doctrines develop slowly.

F. Desirability of Judicially Effected Compulsory Licensing
Any evaluation of the desirability of compulsory patent licensing by
judicial action must be made in the light of the "patent anti-trust dilemma" inherent in which is the desire to effectuate the policies of the
anti-trust laws and at the same time preserve the legitimate scope of patents and the policy of the patent laws. That judicial action is the best
See U.S. Rev. Stat. tit. 60 ~4921 (1898); 60 Stat. L. 778.
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 35 S.Ct. 221 (1915). See
Egry Register Co. v. Standard Register Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1928), 23 F. (2d) 438; Activated
Sludge, Inc. v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, (N.D. Ill. 1946), 64 F.Supp. 25. See 65 F.Supp.
271 (1946) for this phase of the Hartford-Empire case.
163 United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. ,i 57,601 (D.C.
Del. 1947).
1111
162
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medium for accomplishing this balance is the opinion of most thoughtful
writers. Speaking of the compulsory licensing provision of the HartfordEmpire decree, one writer has said:
"Although this appears on first consideration to be a loss, I am
not so sure it does not in fact constitute a gain. No one can deny that
there have been instances of deliberate and willful abuses by patentees of the fundamental purposes of the patent system, and that
such abuse has not infrequently involved the use of restrictive licenses. Such abuses as have existed are, of course, the fuel for the
perennial movements in Congress for so-called remedial legislation.
The advocates of this remedial legislation, unfamiliar with the
patent system, have perhaps not unnaturally selected a fire axe
instead of a screwdriver to fix what is after all a rather delicate
mechanism. But, to pursue the metaphor, this selection may in
part have been due to the fact that no screwdriver was available.
"The Supreme Court has now furnished us in the Hartford-Empire case with something at least much more like the necessary
screwdriver. The remedy of compulsory licensing at a reasonable
royalty, applied by the courts only after there has been a definite
finding of an abuse of patent rights such as is involved in a violation
of the antitrust laws, is a very flexible and specific remedy which
can be fashioned by the courts to fit the circumstances of the particular case involved. . . ."164
Indeed, Mr. Arnold himself, speaking of the enforcement of the antitrust laws has said:
"These principles (of The Rule of Reason) have no meaning
except when applied to concrete situations; the reasonableness of
combination cannot be determined in the abstract. A case by case
adjustment between the techniques of mass production on one hand
and free competition on the other is the only method by which
reasonable and fair enforcement of the anti-trust laws can be effected.... The great advantage of applying the Rule of Reason is that
it allows us to take up one problem at a time in the light of its particular facts. This is the only way of avoiding the pitfalls of general
regulation and permanent social planning."105
Again the same author, speaking of patent abuses wrote: "Such situations are easy to deal with if there is an organization in the Antitrust
Division able to take care of complaints and to watch the distribution
of the principal necessities of living."166
164 Coburn, "Compulsory Licensing by the Courts," 28 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 180 at 188
(1946). See also 45 Col. L.Rev. 601 (1945).
165 Arnold, "Antitrust Law Enforcement, Past and Future,'' 7 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 5 at 14 (1940).
166 ARNOLD, THE BorrLENECKS oF Bus1NEss, p. 30 (1940).

